






In this classroom experiment students represent ﬁrms that make investment
decisions.They play a repeated game with each ﬁrm privately choosing its level of
investment.Participating in the experiment helps students understand theories
that posit coordination failure as the cause of economic ﬂuctuations.Students see
that when ﬁrms expect a recession,their resulting low levels of investment actually
cause a recession.Likewise,when ﬁrms expect an expansion,their resulting high
levels of investment cause an expansion.The experiment can be used in
undergraduate principles or intermediate macroeconomics classes of 8–60
students.It does not require computers and takes approximately 50 minutes to run
and discuss.
Introduction
A classroom experiment puts students in a controlled environment and asks them
to make economic decisions.Their decisions become the data the class later
analyses.This experiment uses a hands-on approach to help students see how
uncertainty can cause and prolong a recession.The paper describes how to run the
experiment and follow it up with a discussion of policies designed to reduce the
uncertainty that can cause economic ﬂuctuations.
Description of the experiment
Students represent strategically interdependent ﬁrms who,in each round of the
game,simultaneously and privately decide their level of investment in new
factories and equipment.Firms can choose either a high (H) or a low (L) level of
investment.A ﬁrm that chooses a high level can produce more goods.However,
households could afford to purchase these new goods only if national income rises.International Review of Economics Education
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National income would rise if other ﬁrms simultaneously chose to invest at a high
level,thus raising aggregate demand.However,if other ﬁrms invest at a low level,
generating low aggregate demand,then a ﬁrm that invests at a high level will have
incurred a large expense without a corresponding increase in revenue.In contrast,a
ﬁrm that invests at a low level avoids the expense of high investment.So,this latter
ﬁrm does not suffer as much when aggregate demand is low.Thus,unless the other
ﬁrms in the economy invest at a high level,a ﬁrm does better to choose a low level
of investment.
The instructor forms the class into groups of four to play the game described in
Table 1.Each group represents an economy.Having multiple groups allows the
class to generate results for several economies simultaneously (see Appendix A for
the instructions).A printable version of the instructions and a student record-
keeping sheet can be accessed online by going to
http://people.whitman.edu/~hazlett/econ/.
Table 1:Payoffs for the investment game 
Of the 3 other ﬁrms in your group, 0 1 2 3
the number who choose H
Your proﬁts if you choose H 0 1 3 5
Your proﬁts if you choose L 2 3 4 4
Table 1 describes the payoffs to one ﬁrm,depending on what the three other ﬁrms
in the group choose.Small,individually wrapped candies such as Hershey’s Kisses
serve as the payoffs.The ﬁrst column in Table 1 shows a ﬁrm’s proﬁts when no one
else in the group chooses H.In this case,a ﬁrm that chooses H would get a proﬁt of
zero.If the ﬁrm had instead chosen L,it could have avoided the futile expense of
high investment during a recession,thereby earning proﬁts of 2.Similarly,the last
column shows the ﬁrm’s proﬁts if all three of the other players choose H.The ﬁrm
would earn 5 if it also chooses H,but only 4 if it chooses L.With an expansion
underway,the ﬁrm does better by investing at a high rather than low level.The
middle columns describe the other possible situations in which a ﬁrm could ﬁnd
itself.
The one-shot game has two pure-strategy Nash equilibria.In one equilibrium,all of
the ﬁrms invest at a low level,causing a recession.In the other equilibrium,all of the
ﬁrms invest at a high level,causing an expansion.The various other possible
outcomes generate intermediate levels of aggregate output.In each case,the more
ﬁrms that choose H,the higher the combined proﬁts of the ﬁrms.Moreover,
everyone choosing H produces the highest possible proﬁt for each individual ﬁrm.
However,because choosing H entails risk,coordinating on this optimal outcomeA Classroom Investment Coordination Experiment
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may prove difficult.A ﬁrm must believe that everyone else in the group will choose
H for its best response to be H.
Students will repeat the game several times,and the instructor can change group
members for each round.Repeated play generates a series of data for each
economy,so the class can compare these performances through the rounds.What
is more,repeated play captures the continuing nature of the investment game that
real ﬁrms play.I suggest running approximately 6–8 rounds.The instructor does not
tell students how many rounds they will play,thus generating the equivalent of an
inﬁnitely repeated game with a discount rate equal to the probability of the game
ending that round.1 For simplicity,each round is completely independent from the
previous one.That is,an investment decision affects payoffs in this round,but not in
the future.Essentially,the capital produced by investment completely depreciates
before the next round.
Changing the group members allows the instructor to include students who did
not initially join a group,either because the class was not divisible by four or
because a student showed up late.It works well to have 1–3 students sitting out
each round,waiting to get switched into an economy.When they ﬁrst join an
economy,the unknown element they represent generates uncertainty,mimicking
the real-world effect of new ﬁrms starting up.Similarly,switching a few members
between groups can change their expectations and trigger ﬂuctuations in
aggregate investment.
In order to keep students focused on their decisions in each round (and also to
avoid overwhelming them with too much candy),only one round provides actual
payoffs.The instructor announces before the experiment begins that a die roll at
the end of the experiment will determine which round provides payoffs.After an
experiment that lasted more than six rounds,the instructor rolls the die twice,once
to determine whether the payoffs will come from the ﬁrst or last half of the
experiment,and again to determine the payoff round.Students who were sitting
out during that round collect the average payoff for the class as a whole.Note that
the maximum possible payoff provides ﬁve candies per students.A one-pound bag
of Hershey’s Kisses contains 100 pieces,the maximum payoff for a class of 20
students.
In each round,students privately record their investment choices and the names of
the people in their group (see Appendix B for this record-keeping sheet).Once all
the students have ﬁnished recording their choices for a round,the instructor asks
each to report this choice to the class.Students then record their group’s results,
and their own proﬁt for that round.In order to track each ﬁrm’s investment level
and each economy’s performance through the rounds,the instructor uses theInternational Review of Economics Education
66
board to display the results.The instructor can then ask the class in a follow-up
discussion to interpret how each economy performed.For instance,no ﬁrms
choosing H generates the equivalent of a severe recession in that round.Similarly,
one ﬁrm choosing H generates a mild recession,two choosing H generates an
intermediate outcome,three choosing H generates a mild expansion,and all four
choosing H generates a strong expansion.
In the initial rounds,the instructor does not allow students to talk directly to each
other about the game.This restriction on direct communication reﬂects the
physical and legal limitations on communication between ﬁrms in an actual
economy.However,instructors can lead a general class discussion between rounds,
as students report their choices.This discussion mimics the indirect communication
between ﬁrms provided by business newspapers and trade publications.The
instructor asks a few students to explain the reasoning behind their choices,much
like a newspaper reporter interviewing a ﬁrm’s manager.In response,some
students explain their concerns about the risk involved in choosing H.Others
describe their own choice of H as a signal that they would like to see all the
members of their group choose H,to everyone’s beneﬁt.This indirect
communication can inﬂuence expectations,thereby affecting future choices.For
instance,a wave of optimism about the investment climate might hit a group in
which one or more members make a veiled plea for everyone to choose H.Likewise,
a group in which members worry aloud about the riskiness of H might suffer a bout
of pessimism.
In the last round or two,the instructor allows students to talk directly to each other.
They can then make statements,and even promises,about how they intend to play.
However,they would still record their choices privately,and have no method for
enforcing any promises.Direct communication generally improves coordination,
producing higher levels of investment.This result inspires discussion of possible
changes in economic structure that promote coordination of investment.Such
changes could include advances in information technology,for instance.
The instructor also makes changes that typically cause coordination to break down.
For instance,the instructor takes one or two individuals who have persistently
played L and substitutes them into a group that has historically achieved high
levels of coordination.Members of that group who previously played H often
switch to L.The resulting recession promotes discussion of how a sudden lack of
conﬁdence in the economy can have dire consequences for investment levels.This
discussion can move on to speciﬁc ways policy makers attempt to maintain
conﬁdence and reduce uncertainty about the investment climate.A Classroom Investment Coordination Experiment
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I recommend waiting to form the groups until after students have made their
ﬁrst-round choices.Not knowing who is in their economy tends to keep students
from signalling each other while the instructor is busy reading the instructions to
the class and dealing with student questions.I also recommend letting students
know who will be in their group before each subsequent round,so that the past
history of play affects current choices.
Early on,some students may have problems deciphering how one ﬁrm’s proﬁt
depends on the actions of the other ﬁrms in the group.I therefore suggest that
after all of the members of a group ﬁnish reporting their choices,the instructor ask
the class to calculate the proﬁt earned by each ﬁrm in that group.Having the class
work this exercise aloud a few times ensures that everyone eventually understands
how to determine proﬁts.Recording these proﬁts on the board provides a reference
for those students struggling to understand.For example,Table 2 shows the results
from the ﬁrst two rounds for a particular introductory macroeconomics course with
20 students.This table displays the proﬁt for each group member,as the instructor
would write it on the board.Note that in this particular class,every possible
combination of play appears within two rounds.After a round or two,the instructor
asks whether anyone needs more help ﬁguring out how the payoffs work.Once
everyone understands,the instructor can stop writing the payoffs,and simply
record the investment choices.
Table 2:Example results,including proﬁts,for the ﬁrst two rounds
Round Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
1 L H H H L L L L L L L L L L L H L L H H 
4,3,3,3 2,2,2,2 2,2,2,2 3,3,3,0 4,4,1,1
2 H H H H L H H L L H L H H H L H L H L H
5,5,5,5 4,1,1,4 4,1,4,1 3,3,4,3 4,1,4,1
When recording the results on the blackboard,the instructor preserves the order
that students report their decisions within each group.Then,a glance down a
column shows a particular student’s decisions in every round.
For classes larger than about 32,the instructor could save time by recording on the
board the results from a subset of ﬁve groups,rather than all of the groups.Of
course,everyone else would still take a moment after each round to report their
choices to the other members of their group,and every student would receive
payoffs.Having ﬁve groups report all of their results provides enough visual
information for the class to compare how different economies performed.During
the follow-up discussion,groups whose results do not appear on the board canInternational Review of Economics Education
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brieﬂy report on what their economy did.The class then considers why some
groups managed to converge on the high-investment equilibrium,while others
converged on the low-investment equilibrium or achieved something in between.
Some comments on payoffs
For the payoffs,I strongly advise using an item like candy rather than grades or
extra credit points.Instructors should especially note that combining a grade for
the experimental outcome with a curved course grade would change the
experiment into a game where students gain by making somebody else’s payoffs
lower.That backstabbing game presents a completely different set of incentives
than those in an investment coordination situation,where everyone becomes
better off if they coordinate.
A cardinal rule of experimentation requires delivering exactly the payoffs promised,
no more and no less.If the instructor gives students any reason to believe that they
will not receive the payoffs as speciﬁed,then they will suspect that they are playing
a different game.This suspicion could well affect their choices.So,an instructor who
has extra candy remaining after distributing the payoffs,should resist any
temptation to dispense the leftovers to this class.
Discussion
The results can differ widely between groups within a class,and between classes.
This variety of results provides rich material for a discussion of the role that
expectations play in generating economic ﬂuctuations.A brief background reading
for instructors on the topic of expectations and investment coordination appears in
Christiano and Fitzgerald (1998).On pages 67–8,these authors present a two-ﬁrm
game with Pareto ranked Nash equilibria as an example of a potential investment
coordination failure.Even in this simplest of games,expectations can act as
aggregate shocks driving the business cycle.If each player expects the other to
choose L,then this self-fulﬁlling expectation generates a recession.Likewise,a
self-fulﬁlling expectation of H generates an expansion.
Instructors need not use terms such as ‘Nash equilibrium’or ‘coordination game’as
they discuss the investment coordination experiment with their students.Nor do
students need a background in game theory in order to participate in this
experiment.Discussion can focus on the economic interpretation of students’
actions,without using any of the language of game theory.However,for students
who do know game theory,the instructor can ask them to identify the pure
strategy Nash equilibria of the one-shot game.There are two and they are
Pareto-ranked.In the Pareto inferior equilibrium all of the ﬁrms invest at a low level,A Classroom Investment Coordination Experiment
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generating a recession.This strategy proﬁle is a Nash equilibrium because if
everyone else chooses L,a ﬁrm’s best response is to choose L.Similarly,if everyone
else chooses H,a ﬁrm’s best response is to choose H.So,in the Pareto superior
equilibrium all of the ﬁrms invest at a high level,generating an expansion.The
normal form for a four-person game cannot be displayed in a single matrix,so the
instructor could not show students a simple payoff matrix like that in Christiano
and Fitzgerald.However,the instructor can guide students through the analysis by
asking them to consider the relevant payoffs in Table 1,which appears in the
instructions for the experiment.For instance,the instructor would have students
note that when everyone else in the group chooses H,a ﬁrm’s best response would
be to choose H and get 5,rather than choosing L and getting 4.
During the follow-up discussion,I suggest showing the class a time-series graph of
investment as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP),with the periods of
recession highlighted.The Federal Reserve Bank of St.Louis’s National Economic
Trends (http://www.stls.frb.org/publications/net/) includes such a graph for the
United States.These data can either provide an introduction to or a quick review of
the volatility of investment,as well as the correlation between investment spending
and the business cycle.Given that investment variations often account for most of
the downturn in GDP during recessions,the causes of these investment
ﬂuctuations take a central role in explaining business cycles.
In the class discussion,the instructor asks students to describe what factors
inﬂuenced their investment decisions.Students who chose L in the ﬁrst round often
describe it as the safer strategy,with its minimum payoff of 2,versus 0 for H.Those
who initially chose H typically explain that they did so in hopes that others would
too,generating more candy for everyone.When students explain how they made
their decisions in subsequent rounds,they talk about whether their expectations
changed.For instance,over time some students report gaining conﬁdence that
others in their group would choose H.On the other hand,some students lose
conﬁdence.
These changes in conﬁdence come from several sources:from experience of past
play,from insights gleaned during indirect communication between rounds,from
group members being switched,and from direct communication.Students
sometimes cite the example provided by a group that coordinated on the high-
investment equilibrium,when explaining how they eventually managed to achieve
such coordination in their own group.In contrast,having someone who had
previously played L switched into a group that had achieved all H often disrupts
coordination.However,sometimes these people continue to choose H.They explain
later that they hoped their history of choosing H would encourage the newInternational Review of Economics Education
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member also to choose H.In fact,sometimes the new people who had played L in
the preceding round do indeed switch to H.They describe being inspired by the
optimism that comes from getting a fresh start.When it comes to discussing results
from the rounds with direct communication,students note that being able to talk
to each other generally helped them eliminate their fears about the risk of
choosing H.
Once the class has had a chance to consider how changing expectations generate
ﬂuctuations in the experimental economies,the instructor can introduce the topic
of real-world policy makers’attempts to improve the investment climate by
reducing uncertainty.I use this experiment towards the end of my principles of
economics or intermediate macroeconomics courses,after covering monetary and
ﬁscal policy.So,in our discussion,I encourage students to consider how a stable
investment climate can come in part from policy makers behaving in a predictable
and forthright manner.I use the following headline from the 1 February 2001 page
A1 Wall Street Journal article to inspire discussion of the actions the Federal Reserve
takes to stabilise the business cycle:“Latest Fed Rate Cut Takes on a Contagion of
Low Conﬁdence:Amid new Signs of Gloom,Anxiety About Recession Could Be
Self-Fulﬁlling.”
Questions for discussion
The following questions form the basis for the discussion described above.
1. What was the outcome in your group in each round? Did your economy have
much variation in total investment over time? How would you interpret the
performance of your economy?
2. Why did you choose the investment levels that you did? What factors do you
think inﬂuenced the decisions of the other people in your group? How did the
ability of ﬁrms to communicate with each other affect their choices?
3. Do you think the success or failure of ﬁrms to coordinate investment decisions in
this experiment provides a possible explanation for the actual ﬂuctuations we
see in aggregate investment? Explain your reasoning.
4. What sort of changes in the experimental setting could help ﬁrms in the
experiment achieve the proﬁt-maximising outcome that occurs when everyone
invests at a high level? Could real ﬁrms possibly achieve something close to this
outcome? If so,what sort of policy measures could help?
5. A 1 February 2001 Wall Street Journal article begins with this headline:“Latest
Fed Rate Cut Takes on a Contagion of Low Conﬁdence:Amid new Signs of
Gloom,Anxiety About Recession Could Be Self-Fulﬁlling.”How might the resultsA Classroom Investment Coordination Experiment
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of this experiment explain why anxiety about a recession could be self-fulﬁlling?
How might the Federal Reserve reduce this anxiety?
Feedback
Two days after running the experiment in my intermediate macroeconomics
course,I asked students to take two minutes to write down what they learned from
the experiment.The following were some of their comments in response to this
open-ended question.
• The business cycle depends on people’s expectations of the behaviour of other
ﬁrms and their interpretation of past behaviour.Communication can help
eliminate fears about coming economic conditions and promote investment.
• If one person in a group is either pessimistic or random,it makes coordination
difficult,if not impossible.People in groups had less faith in new entrants to the
market.Communication within a group helped.
• Indirect communication seemed to have hindered aggregate proﬁts more than
help them.Once one economy did well (all four highs),it encouraged other ﬁrms
in other economies to have more faith and invest at high levels.
Example results 
Table 3 shows the full results for the introductory macroeconomics class whose ﬁrst
two rounds of results appear in Table 2.I ran eight rounds in 42 minutes,leaving 8
minutes for a follow-up discussion.During the ﬁrst seven rounds,I did not let
students communicate directly with each other,although I did conduct a general
discussion between rounds,as groups reported their results.In round 8,I let
students talk to each other.After the sixth round,I had Groups 1 and 3 exchange
two of their members.Table 3 reports the results for all of the groups for the ﬁrst six
rounds,before the switching.Table 3 also includes the seventh and eighth rounds
for groups 2 and 4,which had no switching.Group 5 appears in Table 3 with a new
member (a late-arriving student) italicised in bold.
When I rearranged groups 1 and 3,I wanted to see what would happen to group 1,
with its strong history of playing H,when mixed with a group that had
predominantly played L.So,in round 7,I combined the ﬁrst two students from
group 1 with the second and fourth students from group 3.Of the people coming
from the low investment group,the only one who had chosen H in the preceding
round now switched to L.On the other hand,one who had played L in the
preceding round switched to H,a move she described as inspired by the optimismInternational Review of Economics Education
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that comes from getting a fresh start.The other two continued to play L.All three
who played L explained that they feared their group’s history of playing L would
scare the new members into switching to L.In fact,one of the people from the
cooperative group did switch to L,but the other three continued to play H.These
three playing H reported that they had hoped their group’s history of playing H
would encourage the new members to switch to H.
Substituting a new student into group 5 signiﬁcantly reduced its level of investment
in round 7.In fact,this group was the only group that had anyone play L in round 8,
when students could communicate directly with each other.In the many times I
have run this experiment,both in my own fairly small classes and as a guest
instructor in sections of up to 60 students,I have found that students almost always
coordinate on the high investment equilibrium once they can communicate directly.
Exam question
I use the ﬁnal exam question below to follow up on the experiment.A sample
student answer also appears below.
Question:Consider John Maynard Keynes,who wrote about the macroeconomy
during the Great Depression.Keynes believed it was possible for a recession to be
caused byageneral feeling of uncertainty among business owners about the likelihood
that other business owners would decide to make investment expenditures.Use the
results from our investment coordination experiment to explain why that feeling of
uncertainty could cause and perpetuate a recession.Be sure to deﬁne investment in
your explanation.
Table 3:Experimental Results
Round Group 1 Group 2 Group 3 Group 4 Group 5
1 L H H H L L L L L L L L L L L H L L H H 
2 H H H H L H H L L H L H H H L H L H L H
3 H H H H H L L H L L H L H H H L L H H L
4 H H H H H L H H H L L H H H H H  L H H H 
5 H H H H H H H H L L H H L H H H H H H H
6 H H H H H H H H L L H L L H H H  H H H H
7 H H H H H H H L L H L H
8 H H H H H H H H L H H HA Classroom Investment Coordination Experiment
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Sample student answer:Self-fulﬁlling waves of optimism or pessimism can affect
growth in the economy.In our experiment a ﬁrm was only likely to choose a high level of
investment if it thought it was very likely for other ﬁrms to do so.Investment,which is
the new capital,equipment and buildings purchased by a ﬁrm,was under-produced
due to pessimistic expectations.Once one economy successfully coordinated,it made
ﬁrms in another economy more optimistic about investment prospects.Some
economies remained at low levels of output because ﬁrms had no reason to expect
expansionary behaviour from other ﬁrms.Indirect communication helped ﬁrms
communicate their expectations and reduce speculation.This occasionally spread
panic when a ﬁrm communicated low expectations.Direct communication was the
most effective means of coordinating ﬁrms’behaviour.
I have found,from the answers to this exam question and from general discussion,
that the experiment provides a concrete and memorable example of what
economists mean by investment.After the experiment,when we talk about the
economic role of investment,students ﬁnally seem to understand that we mean
additions to the capital stock,not purchases of ﬁnancial assets.So,as a side beneﬁt,
the experiment helps students stop confusing the economics and layman’s
deﬁnitions of investment.
Conclusion
This experiment demonstrates how expectations about the investment climate can
generate economic ﬂuctuations.Participating in the experiment introduces
students to theories of recessions as coordination failures.The follow-up discussion
covers the issue of how policy makers can reduce uncertainty about the investment
climate that could otherwise lead to self-fulﬁlling expectations of recession.International Review of Economics Education
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Appendix A:Instructions for the investment coordination
experiment
1. You operate a ﬁrm and have to decide when to expand your factory and buy
new equipment.This investment expenditure would increase your proﬁts if the
economy as a whole were about to expand,so that people would have the
income to buy your new products.The economy would be about to expand if
other ﬁrms were also spending on additions to factories and equipment,thereby
increasing aggregate demand.On the other hand,suppose you invest and it
turns out that other ﬁrms did not invest.Then,you would have spent a
considerable amount in a period of recession.Because incomes did not rise,you
would have incurred a large cost without selling any more of your product.Thus,
it would be a bad idea for you to invest if other ﬁrms were not simultaneously
doing so.
2. I will put you in a group with three other students.Your group of four ﬁrms will
represent an economy.Each of the ﬁrms in your group will simultaneously and
independently choose its own level of investment.You can choose either a high
level of investment (H) or a low level of investment (L).The chart below shows
the proﬁts your ﬁrm could earn,depending on what the other ﬁrms in your
group do.You would earn these proﬁts in the form of pieces of candy.Let’s look
at the ﬁrst column of the chart.It shows your possible proﬁts if no one else in
your group chooses H.In this case,the low investment by the other ﬁrms in your
group generates a recession for your economy.Under these circumstances,if
you choose H,you would earn a proﬁt of zero.If you instead choose L,you would
earn proﬁts of 2.Here,choosing L gives you more proﬁt because you avoid the
futile expense of high investment during a recession.Similarly,the last column
shows your possible proﬁts if the three other ﬁrms in your group all choose H.In
this case,the high investment by the other ﬁrms in your group generates an
economic expansion.Under these circumstances,if you choose H,you would
earn proﬁts of 5.If you instead choose L,you would earn only 4.Here,you are
better off investing at a high level to take advantage of the expanding economy.
Let’s also consider the middle columns.What are your possible proﬁts if one
other ﬁrm in your group chooses H? How about if two other ﬁrms in your group
choose H?
Of the 3 other ﬁrms in your group, 0 1 2 3
the number who choose H
Your proﬁts if you choose H 0 1 3 5
Your proﬁts if you choose L 2 3 4 4A Classroom Investment Coordination Experiment
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3. There will be several rounds in this experiment.In each round you will decide
whether to invest at a high or low level,knowing from the chart how your proﬁts
will depend on the choices of the other members of your group.However,only
one round will actually provide proﬁts in the form of candy.At the end of the
experiment,I will roll a die to determine which round that will be.So,any round
could potentially provide proﬁts,but only one round actually will.
4. In each round you will write down your investment decision on your
record-keeping sheet,taking care that no one else can see it.At the point when
you make your decision,you will not know what the other people in your group
are choosing.In fact,you are not even allowed to talk to anyone else in the class
about what they intend to choose.After everyone has made their choice,then
you will ﬁnd out what the other people in your group decided to do that round.
5. After a few rounds,I might switch the members of your group.I will not tell you
how many rounds we will run altogether.
Appendix B:Student record-keeping sheet
Round  Names of the other   Your  Investment levels Your
people in your group investment of the other people proﬁt
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